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MIKLÓS KÖNCZÖL
The Relevance of Roman Law:  
A Look at its Roles and Ideologies*
The paper examines legal historians’ discourses concerning the interpretation of 
Roman legal sources. It does so by analysing two examples of scholarly debates: one 
on the use of Roman law as an atemporal legal doctrine, and one in which Roman law 
appears as a historical manifestation of natural law. The focus is on the different uses 
of the concept of ‘ideology’ and the possible roles of Roman law in legal education. 
It is argued that the concept of identity can meaningfully contribute to our understanding 
of these debates as well as to the study of Roman law in general.
Keywords: identity; ideology; legal profession; natural law; Roman law.
Introduction
Law is, in more than one way, linked to the past, and as Aristotle instructs us, legal 
decisions are concerned with matters that have already taken place. Past actions 
may also contribute to establishing probabilities or to determining an edifying 
punishment. History itself is at times legislated upon, making ‘official’ narratives 
the basis for further decisions, sometimes even protected by means of legitimate 
violence. Yet law has its own history – or histories, if one recognises the competing 
reconstructions of past legal settings. This paper will discuss the latter, legal history, 
and more particularly, the ways in which law is reconstructed on the basis of often 
fragmentary sources, and in which people make use1 of those reconstructions.
* An early version of this article was presented at the Congrès Mondial ISA/RCSL 2013 “Sociologie 
du droit et action politique” in Toulouse. The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers 
for their valuable comments and suggestions.
1 See Costa (2007: 256) quoting Umberto Eco’s distinction of ‘use’ and ‘interpretation’ (cf. Eco, 
1990: 32-33), and Tuori (2007: 10), arguing that “[f]or most of its history the purpose of legal history 
has been something more than simply writing history for its own sake: history served to legitimise 
current policies and acted as a storehouse of examples.” On the differences within ‘Romanism’, see 
Lombardi Vallauri (1985: 341-342), who distinguishes at least three traditions (apart from Justinian’s 
‘Christian-Byzantine’ one): a ‘mystical-universalist’ conception, appearing in the Holy Roman Empire 
and the Roman Church in the early Middle Ages, the ‘republican-revolutionary’ Romanism of the 
French Revolution, and, perhaps most importantly, the ‘technical-universalist’ one, beginning with 
the Glossators and the Commentators.
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The two examples of scholarly discourse to be addressed in the present 
work come from the field of Roman law. While they are concerned with the 
ways in which specific Roman legal institutions are reconstructed, questions 
having a political dimension have been raised in both cases. Thus, when 
one examines legal history, at issue is not only the scholarly method itself 
but also what one does with that reconstruction. 
Before taking up specific examples, a brief mention should be made here 
of the main currents of juristic studies of Roman law, each representing a 
different approach to the possible lessons of these studies. The first and 
perhaps most ‘lawyerly’ approach, and certainly the most influential one, 
at least in Europe, is what is often termed neo-Pandectism.2 It focuses on 
the conceptual system of Roman law,3 and justifies the study of the ‘civilian 
tradition’ with the usefulness of those concepts for modern-day efforts of 
legal harmonisation.4 A related and similarly long-established way of using 
Roman law is the search for timeless moral and legal values underlying its 
institutions.5 From this perspective, Roman law and society may be valued 
for offering a particularly clear view of the very foundations of any human 
society.6 Thirdly, scholars have looked at Roman legal institutions as social 
constructs created in a specific historical context. Here then, differences 
within the ‘tradition’ become important, which also helps one to question 
the timeless necessity of any legal institution.7 While the scholarly debates 
discussed below highlight the differences between these approaches, they 
also show how they may enter into dialogue with one another.
Dialogue, of course, may seem an euphemism here: the texts considered in 
the following sections contain harsh criticism of certain scholarly approaches 
considered inadequate (or even dishonest). As mentioned above, the debate 
2 Perhaps best exemplified in recent scholarship by the work of Reinhard Zimmermann. See esp. 
Zimmermann (1996a), who claims that the study of Roman law is directly relevant for the under- 
standing of modern Western law.
3 And more importantly, considers the concepts and institutions of Roman law as parts of a system.
4 See, e.g., Zimmermann and Whittaker (2000), the first volume-length output of ‘The Common 
Core of European Private Law’ project, including a chapter on good faith in Roman law (Schermaier, 
2000). 
5 For a brief historical overview and critical assessment of both approaches, see Costa (2007), 
who claims that instead of looking for a uniform tradition (which has apparently never existed), it 
is “[r]eflecting on the contradictory multiplicity of traditions” that “can contribute to extend the 
spectrum of possibilities: it can help us contain the tyranny of the present, attribute greater value 
to differences and, for this reason, expand the domain of the conceivable” (ibidem: 269).
6 For recent examples of this approach, see El Beheiri (2012) and Deli (2015), who both look 
at examples of the Roman jurists’ reliance on extra- or pre-legal values, albeit from different 
perspectives.
7 The work of Yan Thomas (2011) and Aldo Schiavone (2005) may be mentioned as representative 
of that current.
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goes beyond the competing historical reconstructions, with the authors 
reflecting not only on the ways, but also the purpose of these reconstructions. 
The two are connected by the concept of ideology, and the similarities and 
differences between the use of that concept in each case will be highlighted.
The first example will be a set of papers with the overarching argument 
that certain Romanists are mistaken as they try to find evidence for the pres-
ence of the legal profession in Roman sources, while denying or downplaying 
the important connection between law and rhetoric. In the second example, 
it is the natural-law approach to Roman sources that is challenged. Trying 
to discover one’s own moral principles in the sources, it is argued, serves 
to conceal the important fact that Romans were able to adapt their legal 
institutions to changing social realities.
The choice of examples was mainly motivated by the more or less explicit 
reference to ideologies. Yet while working on them, it became apparent that 
they also raise further questions relevant to the social sciences in general, 
and the relationship between law and culture in particular. One of these 
is related to relevance. All participants of the discourses examined seem 
to presuppose that there is a lesson: that in some way we can learn from 
a normative system that is no longer valid. Relevance, in turn, is backed by 
various conceptions of identity. It is a combination of two kinds of identity, 
cultural and professional, that induces us to learn from the Romans.
Roman Law as Legal Doctrine
Dutch legal historians Jan Willem Tellegen and Olga Tellegen-Couperus 
devoted several articles to rectifying claims made by German Romanists 
in the 19th century concerning specific legal institutions on the one hand, 
and the early professionalisation of Roman jurists on the other (see, e.g., 
Tellegen, 1983; Tellegen and Tellegen-Couperus, 2000). Some of these 
articles deal with the use of Cicero’s speeches and theoretical writings as 
sources for Roman legal history. In one of these, Tellegen looks at Cicero’s 
speech Pro Caecina, and the way it has been (mis)read by the celebrated 
Romanist, Friedrich Carl von Savigny, father of the ‘Historical School’, 
and those following him (Tellegen, 1996).
In the speech, Cicero argued that his client, Aulus Caecina, was unlawfully 
prevented from entering an estate by a certain Aebutius and his armed men. 
Caecina claimed that he had inherited the estate from the previous posses-
sor, Caesennia, who had a life interest on it. Aebutius challenged Caecina’s 
claim, and they agreed to go before the court to settle the dispute. According 
to Roman procedure, that would require that Caecina first be ‘expelled’ 
by Aebutius from the land (vis ac deductio moribus). Aebutius, however, 
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did not let Caecina enter the property, apparently in order to avoid the 
judicial procedure. In his speech, Cicero had to respond to a series of 
objections made by Aebutius’ counsel: (1) Caecina could not have been 
‘expelled’ as he did not enter the estate; (2) Aebutius did not use ‘force’ to 
prevent him from entering; (3) the injunction Caecina applied for requires 
possession but he was not the possessor; (4) not being the owner, Caecina 
did not have any right to possession either (cf. Grose Hodge, 1927: 86-87).
In his early work Das Recht des Besitzes, Savigny reconstructed Cicero’s 
argument as follows: as neither party could prove ownership, they should 
have focused on the question of rightful possession. Yet Caecina would not 
have been able to prove that either. What he applied for was an interdictum 
de vi armata, and Cicero emphasised the fact that armed force had indeed 
been used against his client, trying to downplay the importance of the 
question of possession. That, in Savigny’s view, was the job of an orator, 
yet that also means that Cicero’s speech is not a reliable historical source 
(Savigny, 1803: 368-369).
According to Tellegen, this was a clear misrepresentation of Cicero’s 
original line of thought (Tellegen, 1996: 103-106). While it was beyond doubt 
that Caecina could prove no possession in the legal sense, Cicero did not in 
fact resort to rhetorical trickery because he did not have to. His argument, 
according to which the interdictum de vi armata was meant to offer redress 
against the use of armed force, and thus the claimant did not have to prove 
that he had been in possession of the land in dispute, was based on a pos-
sible interpretation of the formula, and not invented to mislead the judges.
Tellegen argues that Savigny’s views were shaped by two factors in 
particular. First, he conceived of Roman law as a ‘system’, i.e. an organised 
body of rules, which did not allow for gaps or contradictions. Second, 
he assumed that already in Cicero’s time there was a clear distinction between 
lawyers and advocates, iurisprudentes and oratores, people versed in law and 
rhetoric, respectively. As Tellegen points out, however, neither of these claims 
seems to be supported by the extant sources.
As for the ‘system’ of Roman law, it clearly did not exist back in Cicero’s 
age, the first century BC. What Cicero had to work with was a few laws and 
a series of judicial decisions. Savigny, however, seems to be looking for, and 
projecting back, some sort of an unwritten civil code, as well as assuming 
that Roman legal institutions did not change over time. What follows from 
that is his presumption, according to which if something did not exist in 
the Codex Iustinianus, then it cannot have existed earlier either: if there 
was no legal protection for a non-possessor in the Codex, then it must be 
Cicero’s own invention.
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While that ‘timelessness’ of Roman law is rather interesting in itself,8 
what is of greater importance here is the explanation Tellegen offers for 
it. In his view, Savigny’s research into Roman legal institutions had been 
motivated by the aim to find a model that could be emulated by the emerg- 
ing German law of the post-Napoleonian era.9 No wonder, then, that the 
clearly outlined institutions of the Codex seemed more suitable for him than 
the controversial legal situation reflected by Cicero’s writings.
Tellegen highlights another feature of Savigny’s work, the dichotomy of 
advocates and jurists. While this is not made explicit by Savigny, it is telling, 
he claims, that Cicero’s speech appears among the non-legal sources.10 More 
importantly for Tellegen, Savigny’s dichotomy stands at the beginning of a 
tradition,11 one that tends to discount Cicero’s work as a historical source, 
classifying him instead as an orator as opposed to one of the iurisprudentes.12
It is the same tradition that is in the focus of further criticism in a later 
article on the interpretation of the sources relevant for the reconstruction 
of a famous Roman legal case, the causa Curiana (Tellegen and Tellegen- 
-Couperus, 2000). In a further swipe at scholars who accept the opposition 
of orators and legal experts,13 Tellegen and Tellegen-Couperus wonder 
whether such a position is mere anachronism or whether it can be classified 
as falsification. Stating that falsification requires the intent to deceive as a 
conceptual element, they concede that
[i]t seems highly unlikely that we will be able to prove that the Romanists in question 
constructed their interpretations with the intent to deceive. Here, it is not a question 
of a single frustrated archaeologist, as in the case of the fibula Praenestina;14 these 
8 Tellegen argues that Savigny actually comes quite close to some kind of a natural-law conception 
(Tellegen, 1996: 104), one that would be at odds with his well-known idea of organic development.
9 For a thorough examination of 19th-century German Romanists’ political agenda, see Whitman (1990).
10 This is certainly not the case in the third edition (1818) or the later ones, in which Cicero’s 
writings are listed among the ‘pre-Iustiniani legal sources’ (vorjustinianische Rechtsquellen). 
The first two editions (1803 and 1806), however, have no index of sources. In the main text, the Pro 
Caecina appears among the sources, followed by the Digest, the Codex Iustiniani, and the Codex 
Theodosiani at the beginning of the section on the interdicta de vi (Savigny, 1803: 364).
11 Represented, e.g., by Schulz (1936; 1946), Nicosia (1965), Stroh (1975). On the image of 
Q. Mucius Scaevola, Cicero’s opponent in the case, as the ‘founding father’ of legal science, see 
the detailed discussion of Tuori (2007: 21-69).
12 In an earlier article, Tellegen traced that back to Mommsen (1933, cf. Tellegen, 1983: 294, with 
no. 2).
13 In addition to Schulz, the authors whose views are challenged are, inter alia, Wieacker (1967) 
and Manthe (1997).
14 The brooch called fibula Praenestina, discovered in the late 19th century, bears an inscription 
that is usually regarded as the earliest text in Old Latin. Later, however, suspicion was raised that 
the text was actually a forgery. Recent research seems to support the authenticity of both the fibula 
and its inscription (see Maras, 2012).
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Romanists formed a select body of lawyers with established reputations. However, 
we will try to demonstrate that separating law and rhetoric, in fact, verges on falsi-
fication, firstly because the authors had, or thought they had, the opportunity and 
good reason to uphold this separation, and secondly because they must have known 
that the separation should be considered as scientifically outdated. (Tellegen and 
Tellegen-Couperus, 2000: 187-188)
The explanation they offer is as follows. After the German Civil Code 
entered into force in 1900, Roman law was no longer part of the German 
legal system. Roman law as a subject, however, has held its place in the law 
curriculum until quite recently. Rather than turning to historical methods 
proper, Romanists continued to view Roman law as a ‘system’ in the sense 
of legal doctrine, emphasising its importance for legal education,15 and, 
more recently, for the shaping of a uniform European civil law (cf., for the 
latter, Zimmermann, 1996b). The authors then conclude by noting that 
“[Romanists] give the impression that their staunch support of the distinction 
between law and rhetoric stems from the desire to safeguard their position in 
their respective law faculties” (Tellegen and Tellegen-Couperus, 2000: 188).
The Tellegens’ argument would certainly deserve more attention, par-
ticularly since the connection between the Romanists’ doctrinal attitude and 
the separation of law and rhetoric seems less than compelling.16 Yet what is 
more relevant for the present discussion is their description of what could 
be termed the ‘Romanist ideology’. While they do not use the word, their 
characterisation of the Romanists’ moves corresponds to Marx’s and Engels’ 
concept of ‘ideology’, used primarily in the sense of ‘false consciousness’ 
(cf. Pines, 1993: esp. ch. 4). Romanists, on the above account, established 
and maintained an image of an atemporal ‘Roman law’, which they tried 
to sell to society as the legal system par excellence, an object of knowledge 
that was best situated to introduce law students to ‘lawyerly thinking’. 
Yet that image was an epistemologically false one, and it only served to 
legitimise the Romanists’ presence in law schools. Considered from that 
angle, the opposition of law and rhetoric grows far beyond what could be 
reasonably accounted for as a mere academic mistake, to which all scholars 
are arguably entitled, and is brought to a political dimension. While the 
15 See, however, an 1858 talk by the famous Pandectist, Bernhard Windscheid, explaining that 
Roman law, once ceasing to be valid law, would represent Antiquity, and have an aesthetic- 
-educational value (apud Whitman, 1990: 228).
16 To mention just one example, Frier (1985) disagrees with Nicosia (1965) and Stroh (1975), who 
argued for Cicero’s misrepresentation of the legal issue, but thinks that the Pro Caecina actually 
signals the transition from the orators’ court to that of the lawyers.
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authors compare the situation of Romanists to that of the scholar allegedly 
responsible for the fibula Praenestina scandal, the former case has had a much 
more far-reaching impact on the place of Roman law within the education of 
further lawyers. Interestingly, however, Tellegen and Tellegen-Couperus do 
not draw any conclusion as to the justification for the study of Roman law. 
They merely remark that the Romanists’ attempt at preserving their posi-
tions was apparently unsuccessful, given the recent disappearance of Roman 
law from the list of compulsory subjects in several countries (Tellegen and 
Tellegen-Couperus, 2000: 188).
Roman Law as Legal Philosophy
In the previous section, we have seen, behind the issues of textual interpre-
tation, an example for the conceptualisation of Roman law as a model legal 
system with a crystallised doctrinal framework. In the next example, Roman 
law will play a somewhat similar and yet fundamentally different role, depart- 
ing from the field of legal doctrine to enter that of legal philosophy.
Since Cicero’s De legibus at least, a special link between natural law and 
the laws of the Roman republic has often been established in literature. 
For Cicero, that was quite a natural move. As one scholar recently noted, 
“Cicero models his laws on the precepts used by the Stoics to state imperfect 
duties. He uses Roman laws as a way of filling in the content of these duties” 
(Asmis, 2008: 3). Later authors, however, sometimes look at Roman law, 
and particularly its manifestation in Justinian’s Corpus iuris civilis as a legal 
order that is closer to the natural order of things than any of the modern 
legal systems.
A recent example for the latter approach is Wolfgang Waldstein’s (2010) 
book, Written into the Heart: Natural Law as the Foundation of Human 
Society (Ins Herz geschrieben: das Naturrecht als Fundament einer menschli-
chen Gesellschaft). Waldstein does not, however, argue for the superiority of 
Roman law in itself. Roman law for him is important for two reasons. First, 
as an example that proves the traditional naturalist claim, according to which 
human beings are capable of realising the existence of natural law without 
divine revelation or even belief in God the Creator (see e.g. Waldstein, 
2010: 46; see also Waldstein, 2012: 181-185). Second, Waldstein is inter-
ested in the continuous ‘natural-law practice’ (Rechtspraxis), i.e. an empiri-
cal reality reflecting the knowledge of natural law,17 which characterises 
17 Waldstein’s preoccupation with practice may be explained with the fact that most of his arguments 
are directed against Hans Kelsen’s positivist views (cf. e.g. Kelsen, 1963) and the charge of ‘Naturalist 
Fallacy’ in particular (see esp. Waldstein, 2010: 15-21; Waldstein, 2012: 178-179).
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European legal history, rather than natural-law theories based on philo-
sophical speculation. Given that it was the Roman jurists who made the 
first explicit references to ius naturale, their work is necessarily at the heart 
of Waldstein’s arguments.
One of these arguments, according to which the Roman law of marriage 
defined the institution as the union of male and female, was based on natu-
ral law (Waldstein, 2010: ch. 6) and has been recently criticised by Jakub 
Urbanik (2014). What Urbanik challenges is not the Roman definition of 
marriage, but Waldstein’s claims that, on the one hand, the Roman jurists 
considered marriage to be based on natural law, and, on the other, that 
Roman marriage should therefore serve as a model for any modern legal 
regulation. These two arguments shall be addressed, each in turn.
Looking at the passages used by Waldstein to ground his conclusion, 
Urbanik offers a different interpretation as to the source of the law of mar-
riage. Taking up Ulpian’s dictum at the beginning of the Digest (D. 1.1.1.3), 
he points out that the sentence “[f]rom it [sc. natural law] comes the union 
of male and female, which we call marriage, procreation of children, and their 
rearing”, refers to ‘marriage’ as a specific Roman concept, and not something 
that is already present in nature (Urbanik, 2014: 948). In an earlier passage 
quoted from Gaius (1.158), we find that “a decision under civil law may destroy 
civil rights but not natural ones (iura naturalia)”. While Waldstein regards 
that as an early (pre-Christian) affirmation of the binding force of natural law, 
Urbanik notes that the term ‘natural rights’ refers to those resulting from the 
blood relationship between parents and children, which “can obviously not be 
altered by any human decree” (Urbanik, 2014: 949). The same disagreement 
can be observed in the interpretation of ius naturale in a passage from Paulus 
(D. 23.2.14.2), where the jurist states that “in entering into marriage one should 
contemplate natural law and modesty (pudor): and it is contrary to modesty to 
marry one’s daughter”. Here, Urbanik emphasises that it is not natural law but 
modesty that forbids marriage between a woman and her father even in cases 
where there is no presumption of fatherhood, i.e., where the natural father is 
not ‘father’ in the legal sense (Urbanik, 2014: 949-950). A final passage is one 
from Modestinus (D. 23.2.1), and defines marriage as “a joining of husband 
and wife, partnership of fates in all aspects of life, a communication under 
divine and human law (divini et humani iuris)”. In interpreting that fragment, 
Waldstein identifies ius divinum with ius naturale, linking it to a passage of 
Justinian’s Institutions (1.2.11). Urbanik, in turn, thinks that Modestinus’ 
‘divine law’ cannot be the same as Ulpian’s ‘natural law’, and argues for 
a Stoic conception of nature in the case of Ulpian, which would in that case 
be a non-moral one, similarly to that of Gaius (Urbanik, 2014: 950-955).
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In a second step, Urbanik expresses some doubts as to the usefulness of 
looking at Roman law as a model for morally founded legal development. 
He points out that it is sometimes the social exclusiveness of Roman marriage 
that has been emphasised by Romanists who tried to establish a link between 
the Romans and their own age,18 while others highlighted its dissolubility.19 
But whatever the actual character of the Roman institution, Urbanik also 
makes two further caveats: one against the confusion of scholarly roles, 
and another against the (ab)use of Roman law for justification. The first 
one comes from Tomasz Giaro, who summarises the lessons Romanists can 
learn from previous scholarship on Roman marriage as follows:
One should not confuse the problems of the Romans with those of Romanists, of 
historiography and legal policy. And one should never mistake the Romanist’s craft 
with that of the legal philosopher, the laudator temporis acti, or even with the prophet. 
(Giaro, 2005: 110, apud Urbanik, 2014: 958)
The second caveat concerns the teaching of Roman law in particular. If 
one seeks to support one’s “modern ideological choice with reference to 
Roman legal reasoning, no matter whether the reconstruction be accurate or 
not, puts the teaching of Roman law at risk”, since the latter will be regarded 
by the general public (and political decision-makers) as a ‘fifth column’ of a 
specific ideology they may find dangerous (Urbanik, 2014: 958-959).
By way of conclusion, Urbanik also mentions two fields in which Roman law 
can usefully contribute to the education of future lawyers. The first one is devel-
oping legal skills, and further conveying the insight that law needs to be flexible 
if it is to serve society. That latter is linked to the second field, where Roman 
law provides a historical example, that of the ius honorarium. The decisions of 
Roman praetores have, in many respect, adapted civil law to changing social 
situations, and can be therefore regarded as the predecessors of modern judicial 
activism, a way of developing law ahead of legislation (Urbanik, 2014: 959-960).
Since the role of ideologies is made explicit by Urbanik, it is especially 
important to note the difference between his usage of the concept and that 
18 The two examples, taken from Giaro (2005), are Jhering (1894) and Wieacker (1937a, 1937b), the 
latter praising “the re-emergence of the long-forgotten Roman conubium in the spirit and content 
of the Nuremberg racial laws on marriage and procreation” (Urbanik, 2014: 957).
19 Here, Urbanik mentions Schulz (1936, 1951) and d’Ors (1997), the former regarding that 
feature of Roman marriage as an expression of humanitas, and the latter the ‘pagan mentality’ 
irreconcilable with the Christian approach to marriage. For a view of Roman and Christian values 
as complementaries (with the former bringing relative peace and order into an individualistic 
world that continues to fall short of the ideals represented by the latter), see Lombardi Vallauri 
(1985: 353-354).
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of the authors discussed in the previous section. Romanists’ ideologies, 
for Urbanik, work independently of the epistemic status of their reconstruction 
of Roman legal history. It is, therefore, not their falsehood but their justifica-
tory function that makes them ideologies. Moreover, these ideologies are 
independent of historical research also in the sense that they come first: Roman 
law is used only as an example that supports a view grounded in insights 
not (or at least not necessarily) related to it. Both Waldstein and Urbanik 
could make their argument in favour of the existence and validity of natural 
law and judicial activism, respectively, without any reference to Roman law.
We have seen, then, two different concepts of ideology being used by 
Romanists to explain the interpretive moves of other Romanists. Yet it seems 
that, in both cases, something more would be needed for a complete expla-
nation. The way the Tellegens describe the interpretive practice of certain 
scholars corresponds to the concept of ‘ideology as false consciousness’. 
Where they fail to convince, however, is in establishing a link between the 
opposition of jurists and orators, and the Romanists’ efforts to preserve their 
function within the system of legal education. As just argued, Urbanik’s 
more functionalist (cf. Pines, 1993: 68) approach to the concept of ideol-
ogy does not require any link between a specific ideology and Roman law. 
Moreover, his main claim is not about ideologies, as he only writes that 
the study of Roman law should not be made to serve any ideology. One is 
nevertheless left wondering how Roman law could fulfil such a role. While 
that question is perhaps better directed to Waldstein’s work, which Urbanik 
criticises, it also concerns the usefulness of teaching Roman law, which he 
does affirm. For even if one accepts that studying Roman law makes one 
a better lawyer, that does not in itself grant Roman law a place in the legal 
curriculum.20 In short, the question of relevance needs to be answered here 
as well. In the following paragraphs, a possible answer will be outlined with 
the help of the concept of identity.
Shaping Identities
Roman law, we are often told, is at the root of European culture, alongside 
the Bible and the works of Greek philosophy. In many countries, even the 
emergence of national legal systems took place with constant reference to 
Roman law (cf., e.g., Wieacker, 1981: 257). Thus, in many countries, Roman 
law can be regarded as a symbol of both national and European identity. 
But does that make it relevant for legal education? It may have been the 
case in certain periods and in certain countries, yet even if such is true, 
20 The same applies to the more detailed argument of Thomas (1998).
The Relevance of Roman Law: Its Roles and Ideologies | 109
it may still be more reasonable to dedicate just one chapter in the Legal 
History syllabus to it, as it happens in several countries today. Moreover, 
to begin with the Tellegens’ claim, that kind of national or cultural identity 
cannot in itself explain why German Romanists would need the separation 
of jurists and orators. It seems, therefore, that the missing link is rather the 
lawyers’ professional identity,21 based on the assumption that law, being a 
specific object of knowledge, requires a community of experts to maintain 
and develop the related body of knowledge. Such an identity would explain 
why some Romanists interpreted the sources as they did, and it could also be 
used to argue for maintaining Roman law as part of the curriculum. For if 
we regard our own legal system as continuous with that of the Romans, then 
it makes sense, on the one hand, to assume that they, too, needed legal spe-
cialists, and to have, on the other hand, a subject in the curriculum devoted 
entirely to the study of their legal system. One should note, however, that 
this is a weaker claim than that of the Tellegens, and perhaps a more con-
vincing one, since it does not connect the ‘early professionalisation’ thesis 
to the necessity of teaching Roman law in law schools.
As for Urbanik’s conclusions concerning the usefulness of Roman law, 
these seem to be closer to the professional approach, as they are formulated 
with reference to certain roles specific for lawyers. Here then, the concept of 
cultural or national identities may help to show, this time from a normative 
perspective, why Roman law is more suitable to do the job than other possible 
candidates. While there are several ways in which legal skills can be taught, 
and many others that can be used to develop professional identity (see, e.g., 
Alexander, 2011), these may not be capable of strengthening cultural (e.g. 
European) identity. Objections maybe raised, of course, that using Roman law 
to instil any specific identity can be a dangerous enterprise. Yet the inclusion 
of Roman law (‘the law of the Romans’) as a subject in the curriculum has a 
comparative advantage over modern legal history (‘the history of our law’) in 
this respect. Given that we look at it from a distance, as something that is both 
ours and not, we are more likely to think critically about it than about our 
current legal systems, even from the perspective of natural law, if only we can 
resist the temptation to idealise the object of our study (cf. Watson, 1983: 53).
Conclusions
In this paper, two examples of scholarly debates related to the interpre-
tation of Roman legal sources were examined. What made these debates 
21 See Whitman (1990: 93) on the “professors of Roman law as possessing one of the greatest of 
the old corporate traditions”.
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interesting was the references to the concept of ideology. In the first case, 
ideology understood as false (or forged) consciousness was the charge made 
against German Romanists, who allegedly tried to re-establish their own 
position within academia by arguing for the existence of a specialised legal 
profession in Republican Rome. In the second case, a naturalist approach 
to Roman law, and the institution of marriage in particular, was criticised 
as an ideology (i.e., a framework of interpretation) that may distort one’s 
reading of the ancient sources.
In both cases, the question of relevance has been raised. In the first exam-
ple, the Tellegens wanted to refute the claim they attributed to the German 
Romanists, that the study of Roman law was important for lawyers, since their 
profession originated in Rome. (Their insight, i.e. that legal and rhetorical 
practices are inherently connected, might also be useful for legal education, 
but that was beyond the scope of their research.) In the second debate, 
Urbanik explicitly confronted the issue, trying to offer a different justifica-
tion for teaching Roman law instead of the natural-law one. He pointed to 
the adaptiveness of Roman law, in contrast to the immutability of its values 
(as advocated by Waldstein and others).
A further question underlying these debates, and closely related to the 
relevance of Roman law, seems to be that of identity. In each account, 
professional as well as cultural and national identities played a role. When 
considering a justification for the teaching of Roman law, however, neither 
seems to yield a convincing argument on its own. Instead, it may be the very 
ambiguity of our relationship to Roman law, and its presence together with 
its remoteness, that can afford it a place in the legal curriculum.
Edited by Scott M. Culp
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A importância do direito romano: 
um olhar sobre o seu papel  
e as suas ideologias
O artigo examina o discurso de historia-
dores do direito sobre as fontes jurídicas 
romanas. Para tal, analisa dois exemplos de 
debates académicos: um relativo ao uso do 
direito romano enquanto doutrina jurídica 
intemporal e outro no qual o direito romano 
surge como uma manifestação histórica do 
direito natural. O texto concentra-se nos 
diferentes usos do conceito de ‘ideologia’ 
e nos papéis possíveis do direito romano 
para o ensino do direito. Defende que o 
conceito de identidade pode contribuir de 
forma significativa para o entendimento 
que temos sobre estes debates, bem como 
para o estudo do direito romano em geral.
Palavras-chave: direito natural; direito 
romano; identidade; ideologia; profissão 
jurídica.
La pertinence du droit romain:  
un regard sur ses rôles et ses 
idéologies
L’article examine les discours des histo-
riens juridiques concernant l’interprétation 
des sources juridiques romaines. Il le fait 
en analysant deux exemples de débats 
académiques: l’un sur l’utilisation du droit 
romain comme une doctrine juridique 
atemporelle, et un autre dans lequel le 
droit romain apparaît comme une manifes-
tation historique du droit naturel. L’accent 
est mis sur les différentes utilisations du 
concept d’idéologie et les rôles possibles 
du droit romain dans l’éducation juridique. 
On prétend que la notion d’identité peut 
contribuer de façon significative à la com-
préhension de ces débats ainsi qu’à l’étude 
du droit romain en général.
Mots-clés: droit naturel; droit romain; 
identité; idéologie; profession juridique.

